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— Comment —
“Laboratories of Democracy” or
“Machinery of Death”? The
Story of Lethal Injection
Secrecy and a Call to the
Supreme Court for Intervention
“A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce, or a Tragedy;
or, perhaps both.”1
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Introduction
Lethal injection is by far the most common method of capital
punishment in the United States today. Over the course of the last
three decades, roughly 85 percent of all executions have been by lethal
injection.2 Many states still have other methods of execution available
by law, but in practice only five prisoners have been executed using one
of these alternative methods since the turn of the century.3
In 1982, Texas became the first state to execute a prisoner by
injecting drugs intravenously.4 While Texas has this landmark to its
1.

Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 The
Writings of James Madison 71 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900).

2.

Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Lethal Injection, Time, Nov. 10, 2009.
For a concise overview of the evolution of methods of capital punishment,
from death by hanging to lethal injection, see Brief for the Fordham
University School of Law, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)
(No. 07-5439) [hereinafter Fordham Amicus Brief].

3.

Pickert, supra note 2.

4.

See Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 28.
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name, Oklahoma might have made the more influential contribution to
the current condition of capital punishment when it became the first
state to create lethal injection protocols.5 The story of how Oklahoma
made those first lethal injection protocols serves as a metaphor for the
newest evolution of capital punishment protocols and the subject of this
Comment: Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws.
Before lethal injection, most states used electrocution as their primary means of capital punishment. Electric chairs, it turns out, are
quite expensive.6 The Oklahoma legislature was struggling with the
financial implications of a broken “chair” in the late 1970s when some
legislators began to look outside the box, mulling alternative methods
of execution that would be cheaper and, hopefully, more humane.7 Two
men, a politician and a doctor, spearheaded the movement to find a
way to execute prisoners by injecting deadly drugs. Assembly Member
Bill Wiseman, the politician, first approached the state medical board
with the idea but was rebuffed over concerns of public perception.8
Wiseman then sought the help of Dr. Jay Chapman, the state medical examiner at the time.9 Despite the fact that Chapman admitted to
having “no experience” with creating lethal drug concoctions, Chapman
and Wiseman sat down together one day to crank out a lethal injection
protocol.10 Chapman’s protocol, as dictated to Wiseman, went as
follows: “An intravenous saline drip shall be started in the prisoner’s
arm, into which shall be introduced a lethal injection consisting of an
ultra-short-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical
paralytic.”11

5.

Id. at 15.

6.

Senator Bill Dawson estimated in 1977 that it would cost Oklahoma about
$62,000 to fix its electric chair. See Deborah Denno, When Legislatures
Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of
Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 Ohio
St. L.J. 63, 95 (2002).

7.

See id. at 95–96 (noting that the legislators were given assurances that
lethal injection was “extremely humane” compared to the electric chair
or gas chambers).

8.

Robbie Byrd, Informal Talks Opened Door to Lethal Injection, The
Huntsville Item, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.itemonline.com/news/local
_news/informal-talks-opened-door-to-lethal-injection/article_c48882d139b2-5613-820c-eda28193d4e0.html.

9.

Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 17–18.

10.

Human Rights Watch, So Long as They Die: Lethal Injections
in the United States 14 (2006), http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2
006/04/23/so-long-they-die-0; see also Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note
2, at 18 (noting that Chapman and Wiseman “hastily dictated” their
execution method).

11.

Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 18.
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Another Oklahoma legislator, State Senator Bill Dawson, was also
looking into the possibility of a lethal injection protocol. Dawson met
with a friend, Dr. Stanley Deutsch, who was the head of the
anesthesiology department at Oklahoma Medical School. In a letter
that would influence the state legislature’s eventual bill, Dr. Deutsch
suggested that prisoners be given a heavy dose of an anesthetic.12 Thus,
a three-drug protocol was born: the first drug anesthetized, the second
drug paralyzed and ceased breathing, and the third drug stopped the
heart.13 Each drug alone would produce death in the amounts called for
by the protocols.14 When asked why he chose to use three drugs,
Chapman responded by saying, “You just wanted to make sure the
prisoner was dead at the end, so why not just add a third lethal drug?”15
Perhaps the most startling aspect of this story, the story of the
birth of lethal injection in the United States as the modern method of
capital punishment,16 is the utter lack of medical or scientific expertise
supporting it. Dr. Chapman later described how he came up with the
idea of the multiple drug protocol: “I didn’t do any research. I just
knew from having been placed under anesthesia myself . . . what we
needed. I wanted to have at least two drugs in doses that would each
kill the prisoner, to make sure if one didn’t kill him, the other would.”17

12.

Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 2. See also Deborah W. Denno,
The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death
Penalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 49, 67 (2007); Fordham Amicus Brief,
supra 2, at 19 (“Although these specific drugs apparently were considered
and discussed with Chapman at the time, the legislators chose instead to
propose vague statutory language, which specified neither specific drugs
nor doses. They did so because they were uncertain how much time would
pass before a lethal injection execution would be carried out and thus
contemplated that drug technology might advance by that time. See id.
In effect, the result of this decision was the delegation to Oklahoma prison
officials of all critical decisions regarding the implementation of lethal
injection.”) (internal citation omitted).

13.

See Pickert, supra note 2.

14.

Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 2.

15.

Id. at 15.

16.

Nazi Germany experimented with lethal injection in a large-scale euthanasia program. For a physician’s take on the parallels between that Nazi
program and lethal injection in the United States, see Jonathan I. Groner,
Lethal Injection: A Stain on the Face of Medicine, 325 Brit. Med. J.
1026 (2002).

17.

See Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 15; see also Fordham
Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 15 (“The historical evidence demonstrates
that states adopted the nearly ubiquitous three-drug lethal injection
protocol quickly and haphazardly. In so doing, they engrained a seemingly
modern, scientific method of execution without conducting any relevant
medical or scientific study or soliciting input from appropriate experts.”).
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The three-drug protocol was an answer to the political question,
“How can the state continue executing prisoners in the wake of
Oklahoma’s broken electric chair?” Oklahoma and Texas then served
as the laboratories for developing and implementing these first lethal
injection procedures. Other states fell in line soon after the first years
of lethal injection, usually by simply copying the procedures that
Oklahoma and Texas had used.18 These protocols remained in place in
most states for about three decades.19
The old protocols are now changing in response to a new political
impediment to lethal injection: pharmaceutical manufacturers are refusing to provide states with the drugs needed to execute prisoners.20
At its essence, the problem is lethal injection’s version of the broken
electric chair. Just like Oklahoma’s broken electric chair in the late
1970s, this impediment has state legislatures haphazardly throwing
ideas at the wall to see what sticks. As Fordham law professor and
noted death penalty scholar Deborah W. Denno puts it, “states are just

18.

Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 15 (“Oklahoma was the first state
to adopt a lethal injection protocol, in 1977. Almost immediately
thereafter, state after state—including Kentucky—uncritically copied Oklahoma’s procedure.”).

19.

See Deborah Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 Geo. L.J.
1331, 1335 (2014) (“There have been more changes in lethal injection
protocols during the past five years than there have been in the last three
decades.”).

20.

See Mark Berman, Ohio Drops Controversial Lethal Injection Drug,
Postpones Upcoming Execution, Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 2015, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/01/09/ohio-drops
-controversial-lethal-injection-drug-postpones-upcoming-execution/
(“[The] ongoing drug shortage . . . has caused states . . . to scramble to
find the necessary drugs or consider alternative methods of execution.”);
Alan Johnson, Judge Orders Temporary Moratorium on Ohio Executions,
Columbus Dispatch, May 29, 2014, http://www.dispatch.com/
content/stories/local/2014/05/28/temporary-moratorium-on-lethal-inject
ions.html (noting widespread controversy since the time “European manufacturers either stopped making drugs used in executions or refused to
sell them to U.S. distributors”); Manny Fernandez, Executions Stall as
States Seek Different Drugs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/09/us/executions-stall-as-states
-seek-different-drugs.html?_r=0 (“Looking for alternatives, state prison
systems have been more eager to try new drugs, buy drugs from new
sources, keep the identities of their drug suppliers secret and even swap
drugs among states.”); Makiko Kitamura & Adi Narayan, Europe Pushes
to Keep Lethal Injection Drugs from U.S. Prisons, BusinessWeek, Feb.
7, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-02-07/europepushes-to-keep-lethal-injection-drugs-from-u-dot-s-dot-prisons.

1272

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 4·2015
“Laboratories of Democracy” or “Machinery of Death”?

scrambling for drugs, and they’re changing their protocols rapidly and
carelessly.”21
While the new protocols vary among states and are still in their
infancy, certain trends are emerging as states try to right the ship as
quickly as possible. One common thread connecting nine states, all of
which are dealing with similar problems, is the emergence of laws that
make confidential certain information concerning the processes involved
in creating, distributing, and administering the lethal injection drugs.22
These laws, Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws, have generated a lot of
criticism.23 Important to this Comment, these laws have also given rise
to a number of constitutional challenges brought by prisoners on death
row seeking to delay or terminate their executions.24
At the heart of each constitutional challenge is a claim that the
state’s secrecy law violates the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause by depriving the challenger of information needed to show that
the execution will be “cruel and unusual.” Reviewing courts have
generally upheld the laws, but the majority opinions tend to leave some
doubt about the constitutional questions.25
21.

Fernandez, supra note 20. Denno also notes that “[w]e have seen more
changes in lethal injection protocols in the last five years than we have
seen in the last three decades.” Id.

22.

These nine states are as follows: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-757 (2009); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 945.10 (West Supp. 2015); Ga.
Code Ann. § 42-5-36 (West 2014); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:570 (Supp.
2015); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 546.720 (West 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 2949.221–.222 (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 85.10 (2014); S.C. Code
Ann. § 24-3-580 (2010). Texas does not have a specific law but will not
disclose information about pharmacies as part of the safety exemption to
public information laws.

23.

See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, No. 14-1388, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3602, at
*7 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014) (Bye, J., dissenting) (“Missouri has again, at
the eleventh hour, amended its procedure and again is ‘using [a] shadow
pharmac[y] hidden behind the hangman’s hood’ and ‘copycat
pharmaceuticals’ to execute another death row inmate.”) (internal
citations omitted); Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth
Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 1367 (2014) (arguing that
secrecy laws violate the due process that is implicit in the Eighth Amendment); Nathanial A.W. Crider, Note, What You Don’t Know Will Kill
You: A First Amendment Challenge to Lethal Injection Secrecy, 48
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1 (2014) (arguing that secrecy laws violate
a First Amendment public right of access to government information).

24.

See, e.g., Sells v. Livingston, 750 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2014); In re Lombardi,
741 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2014); Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413 (5th Cir.
2013); Schad v. Brewer, No. CV-13-2001, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145387
(D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2013); Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2014); Lockett
v. Evans, 380 P.3d 488 (Okla. 2014).

25.

See, e.g., Hill, 758 S.E.2d at 800 (suggesting that Georgia’s secrecy law
may be unconstitutional if applied to a case that came closer to meeting
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This Comment is divided into three sections. Part I tells the story
of Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws and further explains what the laws do.
Part II examines a sampling of the constitutional challenges to state
secrecy laws. Part III posits that the Supreme Court standards used by
lower courts to uphold the laws are incompatible with the constitutional
questions raised by the challenges. Part III ultimately concludes that
the Supreme Court should intervene, both to slow the haphazard spread
of the secrecy laws and to give lower courts (and states) guidance on
the unique constitutional issues the laws present.

I.

The Story Behind Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws

This Part is intended to provide the backstory of Lethal Injection
Secrecy Laws while highlighting an analogy to Oklahoma’s process in
creating the original protocols over thirty years ago. It also hints at a
theory driving the focus of this Comment: when it comes to the death
penalty, the states do not function as the “laboratories of democracy”
that is the genius of our federal system.26 Instead, states act more like
mechanics tasked with keeping the “machinery of death” operational.27
In the face of mounting political pressure, pharmaceutical manufacturers have been refusing to provide states with some of the most
common drugs used in lethal injection protocols. For example, in 2009,
Hospira, Inc. ceased domestic production of sodium thiopental due to a
material supply problem.28 For years, Hospira had been the sole supplier
of the anesthetic, the first drug injected in multiple states’ three-drug
the Eighth Amendment standard articulated in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35
(2008)); Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 896 (deciding the Eighth Amendment
claim based on plaintiffs’ failure to show that the state had available
alternative methods of execution, not based on the substance of whether
secrecy laws might otherwise be unconstitutional); Sepulvado, 729 F.3d at
417 (concluding that petitioner failed to meet the standard for injunction
on his due process claim against Louisiana’s secrecy law without
addressing the merits of a possible underlying Eighth Amendment claim).
26.

This popular phrase is derived from former Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).

27.

The phrase “machinery of death” comes from a well-known dissent from
former Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, in which Blackmun
wrote, “From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery
of death.” Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1994). The phrase also appears in the title of a book that equates
capital punishment to a mechanical system. Machinery of Death: The
Reality of America’s Death Penalty Regime (David R. Dow &
Mark Dow eds., 2002).

28.

Denno, supra note 19, at 1360.
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protocol.29 The company originally planned to continue production at
a plant in Italy but faced pressure from increasingly tough export laws
in Europe and threat of prosecution from Italian authorities.30
Consequently, Hospira announced that it would no longer produce
sodium thiopental.31 Although it was not necessarily identified as such
at the time, this became a watershed moment for lethal injection
protocols; it was the first sign that the thirty-year-old protocols might
be failing.32
As mentioned above, the European Union has implemented measures that regulate the export of drugs commonly associated with lethal
injections, such as sodium thiopental and pentobarbital.33 These

29.

See Beaty v. FDA, 853 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining why
some states began to search for overseas suppliers of thiopental). The
incredible extent of those states’ desperation to find a new supplier of
thiopental is illustrated by the fact that the FDA came down on the states
for trying to import the anesthetic, “misbranded” and “unapproved,” from
a company, Dream Pharma, that ran its business in the back of a driving
school in London. See id. at 34; see also Bill Rankin, Georgia’s High Court
to Take Look at Lethal-Injection Secrecy Law, ATLANTA J.
CONSTITUTION
(Feb.
14,
2014),
http://www.ajc.com/
news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/georgias-high-court-to-take-lookat-lethal-injecti/ndPSr/ (explaining that “[i]n 2011, Drug Enforcement
Administration officials seized Georgia’s supply of sodium thiopental after
lawyers for a condemned inmate accused the state of improperly
importing the drug from England”).

30.

See Denno, supra note 19, at 1360–61 (noting that the Italian authorities
were primarily concerned with “prevent[ing] the drug from ‘being diverted
to departments of corrections for use in capital punishment procedures’”).

31.

Press Release, Hospira, Inc., Hospira Statement Regarding PentothalTM
(Sodium Thiopental) Market Exit (Jan. 21, 2011), available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=175550&p=irol-newsArticl
e_print&ID=1518610. (“Hospira announced today it will exit the sodium
thiopental market and no longer attempt to resume production of its
product, PentothalTM. Hospira had intended to produce Pentothal at its
Italian plant. In the last month, we’ve had ongoing dialogue with the
Italian authorities concerning the use of Pentothal in capital punishment
procedures in the United States—a use Hospira has never condoned.”).

32.

See Denno, supra note 19, at 1361 (explaining that “[t]he shortage of
sodium thiopental led prison officials to seek out questionable alternative
sources of the drug throughout the world” and that “[s]uch practices
raised concerns that prisoners may be injected with drugs that are impure,
expired, unsafe, or ineffective”).

33.

See Press Release, European Comm’n, Comm’n Extends Control over
Goods Which Could Be Used for Capital Punishment or Torture (Dec.
20, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1578
_en.pdf (“[T]rade of certain anaesthetics, such as sodium thiopental,
which can be used in lethal injections, to countries that have not yet
abolished the death penalty, will be tightly controlled.”); Kitamura &
Narayan, supra note 20 (“[T]he European Commission amended its so-
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regulations are important to the story because some of the major
producers of those drugs are based in Europe. Perhaps the most important of these producers is a Danish pharmaceutical company, Lundbeck,
Inc. Lundbeck has been a particularly critical cog in the states’
“machinery of death” because it is the only producer of injectable
pentobarbital in the world.34 Pentobarbital is the most common drug
in state lethal injection protocols; “[f]ourteen states have used pentobarbital in executions”; five states have added pentobarbital to their
protocols; and one state, Colorado, lists pentobarbital as a backup
anesthetic.35 In January 2011, Lundbeck announced that it would no
longer sell pentobarbital to states for use in executions and that it
would forbid buyers from reselling it to states that would use it for
lethal injection.36
States subsequently scrambled to keep scheduled executions going.
Ohio switched to a two-drug cocktail of midazolam (a sedative and
anti-seizure drug) and hydromorphone (a painkiller derived from
morphine) in time to execute Dennis McGuire in January 2014.37 Despite receiving a warning from at least one prominent anesthesiologist
that the drugs would produce gasping for air and “a terrible, arduous,
called Torture Goods Regulation . . . to impose export controls on
pentobarbital as well as sodium thiopental.”).
34.

Lundbeck, the Sole Producer of Lethal Injection Drug, Announces It Is
Blocking Supply to U.S. Execution Chambers, Death Penalty News
(July 1, 2011), http://deathpenaltynews.blogspot.com/2011/07/lundbec
k-sole-producer-of-lethal.html.

35.

State by State Lethal Injection, Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited Mar.
1, 2015).

36.

Press Release, H. Lundbeck A/S, Lundbeck Overhauls Pentobarbital
Distribution Program to Restrict Misuse (Jan. 7, 2011), available at
http://investor.lundbeck.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=605775. The
American Pharmacists Association, following in the footsteps of the
European Union and the ethical codes that doctors must agree to follow,
recently issued a declaration that says that pharmacists should refuse to
produce drugs for use in lethal injection cocktails. The declaration states
as follows: “The American Pharmacists Association discourages pharmacist participation in executions on the basis that such activities are
contrary to the role of pharmacists as providers of health care.” M.
Spinnler, APhA House of Delegates Adopts Policy Discouraging
Pharmacist Participation in Execution (Mar. 30, 2015), available at
http://www.pharmacist.com/apha-house-delegates-adopts-policydiscouraging-pharmacist-participation-execution.

37.

See Ed Pilkington, Ohio Executes Inmate Using Untried, Untested Lethal
Injection Method, The Guardian, Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/ohio-executes-inmate-untried-untes
ted-lethal-injection-method (explaining that “Ohio’s recourse to the
midazolam-hydromorphone combination was forced by a shortage of
pentobarbital”).
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tormenting execution,” Ohio proceeded with McGuire’s execution.38
The execution lasted about twenty-five minutes, and McGuire
“struggled, gasped, and choked for several minutes” before his death.39
The botched execution prompted Ohio to announce that it would no
longer use the two-drug mixture and (per court order) would suspend
pending executions until it could develop protocols using pentobarbital
or sodium thiopental.40 As a result, Ohio went back to the drawing
board, unwilling to risk another botched execution but unable to obtain
the anesthetics necessary for a single-drug protocol.
Like Ohio, Oklahoma experimented with a new combination of
drugs in response to the shortages. On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma
injected Clayton Lockett with three drugs: midazolam, vecuronium
bromide (a muscle relaxant), and potassium chloride (an anticonvulsant
and sedative).41 This particular combination of drugs was administered
in dosages that had never been used before in the United States.42 The
experiment proved disastrous, as Lockett’s execution took forty-three
minutes and caused Lockett to writhe and grunt; Lockett even sat up
and said, “Man . . . something’s wrong.”43 A lawyer for another death
row inmate equated Lockett’s execution to being “tortured to death.”44
The event led a number of states to suspend executions, and President
Obama subsequently called for a federal review of lethal injection
protocols.45
38.

Ben Crair, Exclusive Emails Show Ohio’s Doubts About Lethal Injection,
New Republic, Aug. 17, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
119068/exclusive-emails-reveal-states-worries-about-problematic-executi
on (revealing that the state received advanced warning from Dr. Mark
Heath, an anesthesiologist at Columbia University).

39.

Mark Berman, The Recent History of States Scrambling to Keep Using
Lethal Injections, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 2014, http://www.washington
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/02/19/the-recent-history-of-statesscrambling-to-keep-using-lethal-injections/.

40.

See Berman, supra note 20.

41.

Katie Fretland, Oklahoma Execution: Clayton Lockett Writhes on Gurney in
Botched Procedure, The Guardian, Apr. 30, 2014, http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/apr/30/oklahoma-execution-botched-clayton-lockett.

42.

See id (noting that in employing a similar method, Florida has used five
times the amount of midazolam).

43.

See Josh Levs et al., Oklahoma’s Botched Lethal Injection Marks New Front
in Battle Over Executions, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/30/
us/oklahoma-botched-execution/ (last updated Sept. 8, 2014, 7:16 AM).

44.

Fretland, supra note 41.

45.

US President Obama Calls for Death Penalty Review, BBC News, May
2, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-27265443. The disastrous Lockett execution also led to criticism about the drug Midazolam,
the subject of a lawsuit and stay of execution order granted by the
Supreme Court in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015).
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Critics and commentators have attributed these and other recent
failures in lethal injection protocols to the haste with which the
protocols were developed. Many have described the states’ collective
approach as experimentation.46 This experimentation with various
combinations of drugs have yielded poor results, with prisoners either
experiencing pain or, at the very least, manifesting the appearance of
pain by making sounds or gestures. As a result of these failures, states
have largely retreated to the drugs that they know will (1) work and
(2) bring less attention to their procedures. The tried-and-true
execution drugs are the anesthetics, mostly pentobarbital and sodium
thiopental.47 With the largest suppliers of anesthetics withholding their
stock, states have struggled to find a sustainable supply.
To solve this problem, states have turned to compounding
pharmacies to make the drugs.48 This is unusual because compounding
pharmacies normally operate in a niche market within the giant world
of mass-produced pharmaceuticals. Generally speaking, compounding
pharmacies do not produce drugs at all. Instead, they exist to alter
drugs to fit the needs of particular patients.49 For example, if a patient
is unable to take medicine that is mass-produced as a gelatin tablet, be
it because the patient cannot take drugs orally or because the patient
is allergic to a nonessential ingredient in the mass-produced version, a
compounding pharmacy will combine the basic ingredients of the drug
into a form that the patient can take without problem.50 Compounding
pharmacies can thus produce the anesthetics that the states need for
lethal injections by purchasing the raw chemical ingredients and
combining them in state-regulated laboratories.
Compounding pharmacies seem like a simple solution to the states’
drug problems. The issue, however, is a bit more complicated. First,
because compounding pharmacies are not federally regulated, there is
a significant amount of concern about the sterility of the drugs that

46.

See, e.g., Victor Li, Nationwide Lethal-Injection Drug Shortage Forces
States to Experiment with Executions, ABA Journal, May 1, 2014,
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/nationwide_lethal_injection
_drug_shortage_forces_states_to_experiment_with_.

47.

See Human Rights Watch, supra note 10, at 21–28 (arguing that the
three-drug protocol subjects prisoners to unnecessary pain and that the
best choice among poor choices is for states to stick to using lethal doses
of anesthetics without additional drugs).

48.

See Fernandez, supra note 20 (noting that the states are responsible for
overseeing and regulating compound pharmacies, not the FDA).

49.

See Compounding and the FDA: Questions and Answers, FDA, http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Pharm
acyCompounding/ucm339764.htm (last updated Dec. 16, 2014).

50.

Id.
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they compound.51 Second, compounding pharmacies object to the
negative publicity associated with producing drugs that will be used to
kill people—even people adjudged guilty of heinous crimes.52 Perhaps
in order to induce compounding pharmacies to supply them with
sodium thiopental or pentobarbital—or perhaps in order to protect
their protocols from further criticism—states are becoming ever more
discreet.
Historically, states have sought to protect the identities of
executioners, both for the sake of the executioners’ safety and psychological wellbeing.53 But with Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws, states have
recently turned that narrow interest into something else entirely. Lethal
Injection Secrecy Laws prohibit anyone from disclosing the identities of
any person or business involved in the process of manufacturing,
distributing, or administering lethal injection drugs. Often this blackout
is enforceable by threat of civil action.54
51.

See Denno, supra note 19, at 1336–37 (noting a “disturbing trend” of
compounding pharmacies selling large-scale batches of medicine without
having to meet federal regulation standards, and, in essence, “act[ing] like
large-scale pharmaceutical companies while hiding behind small-scale
pharmacy licenses”). Professor Denno also cites a CDC report
documenting an outbreak of fungal meningitis in Massachusetts that
killed sixty-four people, which traced the outbreak back to a compounding
pharmacy. Id. at 1337 (citing Multistate Outbreak of Fungal Meningitis
and Other Infections—Case Count, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/hai/out
breaks/meningitis-map-large.html).

52.

See Tracy Connor, Missouri: We Found Another Pharmacy to Supply
Execution Drugs, NBC News (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.
com/storyline/lethal-injection/missouri-we-found-another-pharmacy-sup
ply-execution-drugs-n34226 (noting that some compounding pharmacies
refused to sell anesthetics to Missouri because of concerns about the
“negative publicity and legal hassles”).

53.

See Ellyde Roko, Executioner Identities: Toward Recognizing a Right to
Know Who Is Hiding Beneath the Hood, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2791, 2796
(“Although the method of execution has changed in the United States
since the inception of capital punishment, each method has required an
executioner. Generally, the stigma associated with the job of the
executioner has made the position undesirable. Therefore, throughout
history, the executioner has been hooded—both literally and figuratively.”).

54.

Sub. H.B. 663 § 2949.221(F), 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014)
(“Any person, employee, former employee, or individual whose identity
and participation in a specified activity is disclosed in violation of this
division has a civil cause of action against any person who discloses the
identity and participation in the activity in violation of this division. In
a civil action brought under this division, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover from the defendant actual damages, punitive or exemplary
damages upon a showing of a willful violation of this division, and
reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.”).
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Ohio’s secrecy law is illustrative of the secrecy laws in other states.55
It can be broken down into three major parts.56 The first part prohibits
disclosure of identifying information of all parties who participate in
the process of manufacturing, distributing, and administering lethal
injection drugs.57 The law justifies this policy on its face: confidentiality
is imperative for the protection of all involved parties.58 The second
part creates a civil cause of action against anyone who violates this
prohibition.59 Lastly, part three forbids licensing boards from taking
disciplinary action against physicians who oversee the lethal injection
process.60
Laws and policies that protect against the disclosure of certain
information regarding the particulars of executions are relatively common.61 But Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws are worth closer analysis for
two reasons. First, the scope of secrecy laws is much greater than
necessary to serve the interest of protecting those directly involved in
the execution process; secrecy laws make the entire lethal injection
operation covert, a fact that raises constitutional questions that are the
subject of Part II below. Second, Lethal Injection Secrecy Laws did not
develop and evolve slowly over time, moving from state to state as the
“laboratories of democracy” figured out how to solve a social problem.62
Instead, most of the secrecy laws came out in a short window.63 This
sort of desperation to keep the wheels of death row rolling is reminiscent
of the way the original three-drug protocol was first instituted in
Oklahoma. The three-drug protocol spread like wildfire into other
states, which did little more than copy and paste Oklahoma’s protocols

55.

Cf. id. § 2949.221 (Ohio’s secrecy law); S.B. 36, 88th Leg. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (S.D. 2013) (South Dakota’s secrecy law); S.B 154, 108th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013) (Tennessee’s secrecy law).

56

For an easy-to-read breakdown of H.B. 663, including the state interests
that the law purports to further, see Dennis M. Papp, Bill Analysis: Am.
H.B. 663, Ohio Legislative Serv. Comm’n, available at http://
www.lsc.ohio.gov/analyses130/h0663-ph-130.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).

57.

Sub. H.B. 663 § 2949.221(B), 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014).

58.

See id. § 2949.221.

59.

Id. § 2949.221(F).

60.

Id. § 2949.221(E).

61.

See John D. Bessler, Death in the Dark: Midnight Executions in
America 151 (1997) (noting states with laws that explicitly protect
executioners’ identities).

62.

See Berger, supra note 23, at 1380–81 (noting that states have been willing to “take[] increasingly creative and legally dubious steps to procure
drugs” ever since 2010, when Hospira first decided to stop selling to
states).

63.

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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into their books.64 In contrast to those original protocols, however,
secrecy laws make it almost impossible for the public to stay informed
about lethal injection procedures.
The following Part discusses the primary constitutional concern
with secrecy laws. Specifically, Part II analyzes two approaches that
lower federal courts have used to uphold secrecy laws in the face of
constitutional challenges under the Eighth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause.

II. The Constitutional Concerns with Lethal
Injection Secrecy Laws
This Part describes the main constitutional problem with Lethal
Injection Secrecy Laws: the laws violate a combination of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment explicit in the Eighth Amendment.
Secrecy laws generally preclude challengers from receiving any
discovery from the state about the process of creating the drugs to be
used in the forthcoming execution, including the credentials of all the
people involved in this process.65 Thus, the central constitutional
question amounts to this: how can a challenger show that his or her
execution is likely to violate the Eighth Amendment without the ability
to be informed of the credentials of those involved in the process of
making and administering the drugs?66
Courts and commentators have expressed diverging opinions about
the interests of the states that the laws purport to protect.67 What has

64.

Fordham Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 34.

65.

See, e.g., Sub. H.B. 663 § 2949.221(B)(1)–(2), 130th Gen. Assemb. Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2014) (prohibiting disclosure “by any person, state agency,
governmental entity, board, or commission or any political subdivision as
a public record” or “by or during any judicial proceeding”).

66.

See, e.g., In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 2014) (inquiring
whether the means of carrying out capital punishment violate the Eighth
Amendment); Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2013)
(observing, but not ruling on, Sepulvado’s Eighth Amendment claims);
Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E. 2d 794, 800 (Ga. 2014) (contemplating the
potential existence of “a case in which the information shielded by the
statute were the only essential missing link for the plaintiff in his or her
proof of an Eighth Amendment claim”).

67.

Compare Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794, 805–06 (Ga. 2014) (identifying
one particular state interest as the need to protect pharmaceutical
companies and execution-procedure participants from harassment in order
to ensure that people remain willing to participate in the procedures),
with Editorial, Openness in Executions, 38 The News Media and the Law
vol. 2 (2014) (noting generally the “public’s right to know . . . what’s
being done in its name” in regards to lethal injection), available at
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not been questioned, however, is arguably the most fundamental part
of any constitutional analysis: the standard to be applied. Lower courts
have uniformly relied on a substantive standard from the 2008 Supreme
Court case Baze v. Rees68 to uphold secrecy laws in the face of
petitioners’ Eighth Amendment and due process claims.69 The Baze
standard makes it so that a petitioner must show that the execution
procedure to which he will be subjected poses “‘a substantial risk of
serious harm.’”70 Many courts apply an even more strenuous version of
this standard, requiring petitioners to show the existence of “known
and available alternatives” to the proffered method of execution in
addition to the risk of serious harm.71 Regardless of whether a lower
court applies the more strenuous test, petitioners cannot rely on
speculation about the effect of protocols when they frame their
challenges.
Petitioners’ inability to rely on speculation is the keystone of most
of the lower courts’ responses to the Eighth Amendment and due
process arguments against secrecy laws.72 Because the secrecy laws
prevent the petitioners from getting the information that they would
need to make out a less-searching Eighth Amendment claim, the Baze
standard basically functions as a total bar. And without their substantive, underlying Eighth Amendment claim, petitioners have nothing on
which to base their due process claims.
The following subsections will provide two examples of how courts
have used Baze to uphold state secrecy laws. Part II.A describes the
case In re Lombardi,73 involving a discovery order issued by a district
court mandating that the state reveal the identity of a compounding
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/
news-media-and-law-spring-2014/openness-executions.
68.

553 U.S. 35 (2008).

69.

See, e.g., Hill, 758 S.E. 2d at 803 (finding that the death row inmate’s
“factual assertions fall far short of satisfying the [Baze] legal standard”);
Sepulvado, 729 F.3d. at 417 (finding that Louisiana’s one-drug protocol
was a legal means of execution under the Baze standard).

70.

Id. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)).

71.

See, e.g., In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 899–900 (8th Cir. 2014) (Bye, J.,
dissenting) (noting a disagreement regarding the scope of the Baze
standard, specifically the available-alternatives prong).

72.

See, e.g., id. (issuing writ of mandamus preventing discovery of
information covered by Missouri’s secrecy law on account of the inmate’s
failed Eighth Amendment claim); Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794 at 803 (finding that
speculative factual assertions regarding possible threats failed to support
an injunction) (Ga. 2014); Wellons v. Commissioner, Ga. Dept. of
Corrections, 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court on
the grounds that the inmate failed meet Eighth Amendment standard and
so had no substantive grounds on which to base his due process claim).

73.

741 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2014).
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pharmacy, and a subsequent successful petition to the Eighth Circuit
for a writ of mandamus to prevent that order from going through. The
Eighth Circuit held that the substantive Eighth Amendment claim
underlying the discovery order could not meet the Baze standard and
so could not be used to justify the discovery order.74 Part II.B looks at
a case out of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Owens v. Hill.75 In Hill,
the court took a notably different path to reach the same conclusion as
the Eighth Circuit.
A. In re Lombardi

In In re Lombardi, an en banc panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals issued a writ of mandamus in favor of petitioner George
Lombardi, Director of Missouri Department of Corrections.76 Lombardi
requested the writ after a lower federal court entered a discovery order
that would have forced Lombardi to reveal to the plaintiffs, a group of
death row inmates, the identities of (1) the physician who prescribed
the lethal injection drug (pentobarbital) to be used in the prisoners’
executions; (2) the pharmacist in charge of compounding the
pentobarbital; and (3) the name of “the laboratory that tests the
chemical for potency, purity, and sterility.”77 The writ of mandamus
negated that discovery order.
The plaintiffs had asserted that Missouri’s use of compounded
pentobarbital was likely to produce “severe pain” in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.78 In contrast, Lombardi argued that Missouri law
provided the state with an evidentiary privilege that protected the
identities of the physician, the pharmacist, and the laboratory.79 In
support, he contended that each of these entities was a member of the
state’s “execution team” and therefore was covered under the privilege
statute.80 According to the Director, Missouri had an interest in
protecting their identities because compounding pharmacies might
refuse to provide the state its supply of pentobarbital if the sale came
at the risk of public disclosure of the pharmacy’s name.81 Stated another
74.

Id. at 896.

75.

758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2014).

76.

Id. at 889–90.

77.

Id. at 893.

78.

Id. at 895.

79.

Id. at 894.

80.

The term “execution team” was the state Department of Corrections’
designation of the group consisting of the physician who prescribed the
drug, the pharmacist who compounded the drug, and the laboratory who
tested the drug. Id.

81.

See id. (“[D]isclosure [of the name of the compounding pharmacy], [the
Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections] contends, would
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way, the state’s interest in protecting the identity of the compounding
pharmacy was to keep the “machinery of death” up and running.
The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that Missouri’s
use of a compounding pharmacy was likely to create a substantial risk
of severe pain “when compared to the known and available alternatives.”82 In other words, the plaintiffs lost on their Eighth Amendment
claim because they did not show that death by lethal injection of compounded pentobarbital would be less humane than death by “lethal gas,
electrocution, or firing squad.”83 And without the Eighth Amendment
claim, the plaintiffs lacked an underlying basis for their due process
claim. In effect, the court held that the plaintiffs should have lost on
the merits of their substantive Eighth Amendment claim and so they
were not entitled to a discovery order that infringed on important state
interests; forcing the state to reveal that information could undercut
the state’s ability to carry out their executions.
The Eighth Circuit’s application of Baze is worth discussion for two
reasons. First, the court’s interpretation of Baze is questionable; other
circuits have held that plaintiffs cannot be forced to show “known and
available” alternative methods of execution.84 Second (and more
important), the court’s analysis is ignorant of its own circularity; how
can a plaintiff possibly show that Missouri’s protocol “creates a
substantial risk of severe pain” when the state withholds the
information needed to make that claim? If states are free to keep this
information a secret, then the Eighth Amendment is reduced to an
after-the-fact method for the families of the executed person to recover;
it does nothing to keep individuals free from “cruel and unusual
punishments” at the hands of the states.
B. Owens v. Hill

Another prime example of the impossible circularity that the Baze
standard creates for challengers is evident in Owens v. Hill. Unlike In
re Lombardi, Hill involved a direct constitutional challenge to Georgia’s
lethal injection secrecy law.85 And unlike the evidentiary privilege
trigger collateral consequences that would prevent the Director from obtaining the lethal chemicals necessary to carry out the capital punishment
laws of the State. He cites, as an example, a letter dated October 2013
from a compounding pharmacy in Texas that demanded the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice return a supply of compounded pentobarbital sold for use in executions, because of a firestorm, including constant inquiries from the press.”) (internal quotations omitted).
82.

Id. at 895–96.

83.

Id. at 895.

84.

See e.g., id. at 899–900 (Bye, J., dissenting) (noting the diverging approaches taken in other circuits).

85.

758 S.E.2d 794, 796 (Ga. 2014).
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asserted in Lombardi,86 Georgia’s secrecy law provides explicit
protection for the names of the people and entities that take part in the
state’s execution procedures, including the manufacturers of the lethal
drugs.87 In other words, Hill centered on a direct constitutional
challenge to a clear law, without any of the procedural peculiarities
present in Lombardi.
In Hill, plaintiff Clarence Hill argued that Georgia’s secrecy law
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” in the Eighth
Amendment by depriving him of the information needed to show that
Georgia’s use of compounded lethal injection drugs gave rise to a
substantial risk of severe pain.88 Hill won in the local superior court,
which enjoined the state Department of Corrections from using its
supply of compounded drugs to execute him.89 The local superior court
was reversed on appeal. The Georgia Supreme Court held that Hill had
“failed to show that obtaining the requested information would allow
him to make a colorable [Eighth Amendment] claim [under Baze v.
Reese].”90 The court reasoned that Hill’s concern about the potential
lack of sterility of compounded drugs, as compared with those
manufactured by an FDA-regulated producer, was meaningless in the
context of his sentence.91 The court even mocked Hill’s expert witness
on this point: “Particularly unpersuasive is Hill’s expert’s testimony
that certain contaminants also could have the following effect: ‘Their
blood pressure would drop precipitously, and ultimately it’s possible
that they could die.’”92 The court went on to surmise that “[s]uch a side
effect obviously would be shockingly undesirable in the practice of
medicine, but it is certainly not a worry in an execution.”93
The court spent little time on Hill’s arguments that the potency of
the anesthetic might be too weak or that improper pH levels could cause

86.

See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.

87.

See Ga. Code Ann. § 42-5-36(d)(2) (2014) (providing that “identifying
information of any person or entity” participating in activities surrounding execution procedures “shall not be subject to disclosure” and “shall
be classified as a confidential state secret”).

88.

See Hill, 758 S.E.2d at 801 (noting Hill’s argument “that he was denied
identifying information about the manufacturer of his execution drug that
might have allowed additional clarity to the claim”).

89.

See id. at 797 (noting that “[t]he Superior Court granted injunctive relief,
which it described in various ways including as a stay of execution”).

90.

Id. at 804.

91.

See id. at 802 (holding that Hill’s claims alleged “symptoms that are
irrelevant to a person being executed”).

92.

Id.

93.

Id.
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severe pain. According to the court, “Hill’s expert gave no clear
indication regarding the level of risk involved, and each of these possible
complications appears to be unlikely to occur.”94 Because Hill’s claim
was reduced to speculation about these potential problems, the court
concluded that it did not meet the Baze standard for the Eighth
Amendment.95 Because the claim failed under Baze, Hill was “not
entitled to access to the courts.”96 The dissent in Hill points out the
irony that the majority seems to miss:
The majority reasons that Hill has not shown the statute
to be unconstitutional under the present circumstances because his claims regarding the specific drug that the State will
use to execute him are merely speculative. Admittedly,
speculative claims regarding deficiencies in an execution drug
are insufficient to sustain a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. . . . However, the speculation permeating Hill’s claims
arises solely from the State’s unwillingness, in light of the
secrecy statute, to disclose information that would allow him
to make more specific claims.97
Unfortunately, the dissenting justices were unwilling to take their
analysis further and identify the culprit for this confusing circularity:
the Baze standard.
The next Part follows through with the argument that the Baze
standard is an inappropriate vehicle to use for analyzing the due process
and Eighth Amendment challenges to secrecy laws. This is the case
because Baze was not meant to tackle the due process element inherent
in these challenges. Part III also sums up the argument that the states
are not acting like “laboratories of democracy” when it comes to lethal
injection protocols. For those reasons, this final Part concludes that the
Supreme Court should intervene in order to (1) slow the train of
botched executions that states have had in the last two years as they
adopt new protocols and (2) provide lower courts with more appropriate
standards for the challenges to secrecy laws.

94.

Id.

95.

See id. at 804 (finding that “Hill’s factual assertions fall far short of
satisfying the legal standard applied under the Eighth Amendment, which
involves a showing of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ that is ‘sure or
very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering’”) (quoting Baze
v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49–50 (2008)).

96.

Id. at 804 (quoting Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2013)).

97.

Id. at 807 (Benham, J., dissenting).
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III. A Brief Argument for
Supreme Court Intervention
On January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court denied Charles Warner’s
petition for a stay of execution.98 In a dissent from the denial, Justice
Sotomayor, joined by three other justices, reasoned that the Supreme
Court should have granted the stay because of the convincing and evergrowing body of science suggesting that midazolam is not effective as
an anesthetic and thus should never be used as the first drug in a
multiple-drug lethal injection cocktail.99 Midazolam certainly has been
a problem-child drug for the states, but there is an underlying issue
that Justice Sotomayor’s dissent largely ignores. Justice Sotomayor
does, however, hint at this issue at the end of her dissent when she
points to the “[s]tates’ increasing reliance on new and scientifically
untested methods of execution.”100
Ordinarily, when the Supreme Court denies a petition for a stay
(or denies certiorari) on a novel question of law, it can rely on a
laboratories-of-democracy argument.101 Even when a petition raises an
important question of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court
can always let it play out in the states before it decides on the best
solution. It is my contention in this Comment that this is not an
appropriate issue on which to take such a laissez-faire approach. This
is true for two reasons.
First, the states are not acting as laboratories of democracy when
it comes to developing execution protocols. “Democracy” implies
democratic involvement, and in the case of execution protocols, there
is little, if any, democratic involvement. This is true, in part, because
states tend to leave discretion in the hands of state departments of
98.

See Warner v. Gross, 134 S. Ct. 824, 827–28 (2015) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). Consequently, Warner was subsequently executed, and witnesses to the execution claimed that Warner said “[m]y body is on fire”
as the lethal drugs entered his system. Dana Ford, Oklahoma Executes
Charles Warner, CNN (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/
15/us/oklahoma-execution-charles-frederick-warner/.

99.

See Warner, 134 S. Ct. at 827 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding “evidence suggesting that midazolam cannot constitutionally be used as the
first drug in a three-drug lethal injection protocol”). The Supreme Court
has, since Charles Warner’s botched execution, granted certiorari on this
very issue and issued a stay of execution for those Oklahoma death row
prisoners who were scheduled to be executed by a cocktail containing
Midazolam. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015).

100. Id. at 828.
101. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari) (“Often, a denial of certiorari on a novel issue will
permit the state and federal courts to ‘serve as laboratories in which the
issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court.’” (quoting
McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983)).

1287

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 4·2015
“Laboratories of Democracy” or “Machinery of Death”?

correction. The state departments of correction then have a singular
focus: continuing to execute prisoners. They do so however they can,
many times just quickly copying the procedures of any state that succeeds in pulling one off.102 For example, states like Ohio, Georgia, and
Oklahoma are turning to hasty experiments that are resulting in painful
deaths.103 The spread of death penalty secrecy has proven to be much
like the spread of the original three-drug protocols out of Oklahoma.
The states are making an end-run around a problem (lack of drugs) by
avoiding confrontation and turning to solutions (compounding
pharmacies or new drugs) that are relatively unknown. If history is an
accurate indication of what the future holds, states will likely stick with
this formula for years to come—unless the Supreme Court intervenes.
Second, the lower courts have been left to wrestle with how to apply
Supreme Court standards that simply do not fit the constitutional
questions raised by secrecy laws. The Baze standard for the Eighth
Amendment simply is not tailored to handle challenges to laws that
conceal information. The “substantial risk of serious harm” standard
only allows courts to look one step down the road. It answers the
question of how courts should respond to claims based on what might
happen during an execution. It does not answer the question raised by
Eighth Amendment challenges to secrecy laws, which is how courts
should respond to claims based on prisoners not knowing—and not
being able to find out—what might happen during an execution. In other
words, it does not properly address a due process claim that is based
on an underlying Eighth Amendment claim.
Lower courts seem to recognize the circularity of the due process
and Eighth Amendment problems, but most have sidestepped the issue
by holding that the Eighth Amendment claim underlying the due
process claim is not strong enough to trigger due process rights.104
Courts dismiss the Eighth Amendment arguments as speculative, but
it is the secrecy laws that cause the speculation.105 The conundrum, at
its essence, is that the Baze standard does not address the due process
element at all, making it an ill fit for challenges to secrecy laws.
For the reasons outlined and briefly discussed in this Comment, the
Supreme Court needs to intervene and give lower courts guidance on
the constitutional issues relevant to Death Penalty Secrecy Laws. It is
time that the lower courts stop trying to apply tests that do not fit the
issues. Secrecy laws are new, but like the original lethal injection
102. See supra note 18.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 37–45.
104. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. Other courts have sidestepped the Eighth Amendment issue by holding that the due process
claim is not strong enough to stand alone. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
105. See supra text accompanying note 97.
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protocols developed over thirty years ago, they are spreading quickly.
And given the states’ demonstrated unwillingness to scientifically test
those original protocols, or alter the protocols in response to botched
executions, it is probable that the secrecy laws will remain in place until
another “broken electric chair” spurs change. Given the fundamental
nature of the constitutional questions that these challenges to secrecy
laws raise, the Supreme Court should speak up sooner rather than later.
Harrison Blythe†
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